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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D. 1 Montana) 
RELEASE for p. m, 's of 
FOR REL£ p.St.. 
~~R '> 0 .t:tj 
REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY - III 
THE NORTH AFRICAN CRISIS 
Mr. President: 
On occasions in recent weeks I have address~d the Senate on foreign 
policy, On January 20, I dealt -- as have other Members of the Senate - - with 
the need for a gcn..:ral review of foreign policy, My thought, as 1 expressed it 
at th~;; time, was that out of the r..:vicw "there could come new ideas to fill the 
vacuum, to stop the dangerous drift which has settled over our foreign policy . 11 
A month later, on February 16, I discussed the region of Southeast 
A8ia as it relates to American foreign policy, An ~xamination of the situation 
in that region led me to the following conclusions: 
"1. Thli United States should make clear that it 
stands solidly behind our present obligations under the 
Southeast Asia defense treaty. At the same time, however 1 
w~, should also make ch~ar that we arc always prepared to 
consider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area 
under certain conditions. The conditions are either a re -
cession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia or the 
strengthening of its defenses by the accession of nations 
more directly concerned to th.: treaty or by other defensive 
arrangements. 
11 2. Th~ Executive Branch should make a careful 
r c -o..::xamination of the premises undc:!r which it disp~nses 
military aid, It must bring into its calculations more em-
phatically than H has in the past such factors as genuine 
need and capacity of recipient governments in t..:rms of 
th .. i r defense and the degree of responsibility which thc;!y 
show to thdr own peoples. 
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"Further, the Execuu ve Branch should report 
as fully as possibk to th~ American people on the extent 
to which Amarican equ1pment has fallen into the hands of 
the communists in Asia. I! it fails to do so in the ncar 
future, then the appropriate co;nmittccs of Congress 
mighl well considl.!r a complete investigation of this 
matter. 
"3. Non- military grant aid as a permanent clc-
mcnt of Am<..rican foreign policy should be limited, as was 
intended by Congr~ss, to the Technical Assislanc~:: or the 
Point Feu r Program . If the Executive B r anch presents a 
pro:Jp~ctus for a useful and effective expansion of this 
progral'l' -- and I am not at all sure that this is pes sible 
- - then I btdi.eve Congress should give it sympathetic 
consideration. 
"Large - scale grants of <;conom1c aid to any 
country I wh0n nec.cs sitatE::d by unusual circums tanccs, 
however, should be considered individually on their 
own merits by the Congress . 
"If the Southeast Asian and other underdeveloped 
countries seck long - rang<:. aid for economic developm ent 
unavailable through existing sources 1 such aid should be 
considered as far as pes sible for whole regions and on 
the basis of repayable credits of the most generolW 
terms . The Executive Branch should preso..:nl spc;..cific 
proposals in this connection and not seek a pcrmancnl 
blank check which reveals little of the extent to which 
this countr y might be committed without the clear under -
standing of the American people. and the consent of the 
Senate and Congress as a whole." 
I also pointed out the v1tal significance of the Bandung Confcx-ence, 
th£> attitude of the overseas Chinese --especially in Singapore, DJakarta, and 
elsewhere -- and the altitude of C(;rtain Southeast Asian states toward the 
Geneva Conference between the United States and Communist China -- a 
confer~ncc now in it~ seventh month . 
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My intention, as I have already indicated, is to review developments 
in various critical regions of the world, from time to time -- North Africa, 
Western Europe, the Far East, the Middle East it is pos sibl<• to pinpoint 
half a dozen situations where American policies can profit from examination 
by the Senate. In some of these situations --as in I<or~a --our concern is 
readily apparent. In others, this country appears to be only remotely involved 
or not involved at all. 
Appearances, however, can b<: d~cephve, Mr . Pr esid~nt. What 
seems remote today can become immediate tomorrow. I need hardly remind 
the Senate that not so long ago Formosa and Korea wero scarcely more than 
geographic place names. And who among us had ever heard of the so-called 
o£f-shore islands of China until we were impelled by them towards war? 
The examples could be multiplied, but the: Senate will understand the 
point I am trying to make. Every major situation of international tension --
however remote, however indirect our present concern may be - - every situation 
of that kind car ries a potential impact for the safety and welfare of this country . 
Our {or~ign pohcy must take these situations fully into consideration and the 
Senate cannot afford to lose sight of th\!m. We cannot afford to do so, if we 
are to fulfill effectively our constitutional function of advice and consent in 
forC!ign relatio ns. 
It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I wish to discuss today the 
North African crisis. The difficulties in North Africa have been among the 
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more obscure in their imphcations for American foreign pohcy. On the 
surface they have appeared to have little direct rdationsh1p to tht: interests of 
this country. 
North Africa can bt: regarded, it has been r~garded, as an area '' hich 
involves only France, Spam, the French, Moslems and othl.!r pcopl ... s who 
inhabit Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria . That is one way of looking at the North 
Af r ican situation. If we arc not involved, if it is soldy a matler affecting 
others, then we have no responsibilities and presumably nothing to worry about. 
That is an easy way, Mr. President. But it is an easy way only for 
the moment. It puts off until tomorrow what blurs the seemingly pleasant 
portrait of a world of peace and prosperity today. 
The troubl;..; with that approach, Mr. President, is that it ignores the 
rcpcrcus sions of the c r is1s 1n North Africa which do aff"'ct us directly. It 
ignores the likelihood that an intensification of the crlSis m that arl-a will draw 
us deeper and deeper into the situation . That process h:ts alr~ady begun. The 
recent mob violence against th e American consular post in Tunis, the anti -
American demonstrations, are the first danger signals and we will ignor e 
them at our own peril. 
The easy way, then, Mr. President, is perhaps not as easy as it 
appc::ars to be at first glance. Perhaps 1t may be bettur not to assume that what 
happens in North Africa is of littl~ significance to the Unit~d States. It may be 
9refcrablc for the Senate, for the American people, to begin now to grappl~ 
with the facts in North Africa. 
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lf we do so we may obtain a more accurate understanding of how the 
to tality of our intere sts are related to these facts and how those interests may 
b e st be served. We may s e e that while the North African crisis docs indeed 
involve in the first instance the relationship of the French and North African 
Moslems, it also spreads its impact far beyond this core. It involve s the 
future of the North At1anhc Treaty Organization and European union. It colors 
the attitudes of the Moslem nations and of colonial peoples towards all Western 
nations, including the United SLatus. It affects the historical friendship between 
Franc e and the Unitt;d States which has ils roots in the American revolution. 
It can facilitate the penetration of the African continent by the Soviet Union. 
lt embraces, in the last analysis, the future of France as one of the great well-
springs of We stern civilization and freedom. 
Arc these matters in which the United States has only a passing interest? 
Are they matters which can be sloughed off as of only casual concern to this 
country? Some may so regard them . I cannot share that view and I doubt that 
many Americans, if apprised of the facts, will shar u it. 
Can NATO dismt~ grate; can the animosity of the Afro-Asian world 
b e lurne d against the '.Ve st; can Communist totalitarianism pe netrate Africa; 
can the democracy of France be r e duce d to impvte: ncy i.n the face of to talitanan 
pressure s fro m left and r ight -- can all the s e developments take place without 
the m o st serious implications for this country? Despite the blissful unaware-
m:ss of s ome , these developme nts do threate n to issue from the North African 
crisis. The seeds o f all o f th e m are already germinating in its heat. 
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Those who talk of success in foreign policy may be able to cxorc1se 
this crisis with a smug platitude or a smile of fatuous optimism. The smile 
must indeed be broad, however, if it is to be str~tchcd to cover the situation 
in North Africa. 
Mr . Presulent, I am no enemy of the smile. When it is evoked by 
what is pl\lasant or humor ous, it helps to lighten the burden oi the day. It may 
L:ven have a place in Lhe sober business of conduc t ing this nation's foreign 
r elations just as it has in the conduct of th~ nation ' s political campaigns. What 
it is not, ho wever, what the smile can never be, ia a substitute fo r sound 
foreign policies based on a perc.:!ptiv< understanding of the problems which 
confront us. Nor is it a substitute for careful thought as to how tht interests of 
Lhe United States may best be safeguarded in de:aling wlth these problems. That 
is true in the North Afr ican crisis no less than in oth..!rs , 
We cannot smile avvay this situation and its implications for us. We 
can only fac"" it and seek to de lineate an intelligent course for this nation to 
pursue with r espect to it . That is why I r aise the qu ... stion o! Nor th Africa and 
ask the Senate; to take the time to consider it her\! today . 
I have sought -- as I am sure other M<:mLers have - - I have sought to 
follow as closdy as pos siblc the rapid !low of developments in that region as 
th~y are reported m the pr\lss. Suv~ral mc.nths ago, as a m\!mbcr of the 
Committee on For o:Hgn ~elations, I also found occasion to observe the situation 
first-hand in Morocco. I regret that I was unablt.: to pr oceed at that time 
beyond Morocco to Alge r ia and Tunisia as I desired to do. 
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Limited as this background is, it is sufficient to convince me that 
the pressures are growing for a more direct involvement of the United States 
in the North African c risis. It is sufficient to convince me that our policies 
have drifted dangerously there, as they have elsewhere. It is sufficient to 
convince me that the time is already late for the Senate to focus attention on 
North Africa. If the available facts are inadequate for a complete understanding 
of the situation and. in my opinion they are inadequate, I trust the Executive 
Branch wtll take the troubh: to supplement them . I hope lhat Members of this 
body will see fit to acquaint themselves more fully with them by direct observa-
tion. In a letter to the distinguished Chairman of the Committe~ on Foreign 
Relations, dated October 17, 1955, in which I t r ansmitted a report on Europe 
after the Geneva Conference, I suggested that "in view of the possible repercus-
sions on our policies respecting Europe and the Middle East , it might be 
desirable for the committee to have some members familiarize themselves at 
firsthand with the North African situation.'' I r eiterate that suggestion today. 
In the meantime we can begin to examine the situation on the basis 
of the limited info rmation that is already available. Let me, at the outset, 
point out that it is inexact to r egard all of North Africa as a single cnsis except 
in the broadest sense . The situations in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria have 
many characteristics in common and present many similar problems. There are 
however, also impo rtant diffe rences . If our policies respecting North Africa 
are to be effecttve, these differences must be given full consideration. 
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In the discussion today I should lik~ to turn first to the similarities 
of the situation in all three regions of North Africa. Taki!n tog\;thcr, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Alg~ria constitute a great crossroads, five hmes the size of 
Metropolitan France, lying between the heart of the African continent. the 
Middle East and Europe . Over these cro~sroads, conquerors have moved in 
one direction or another since time immemorial. The great religious move-
ments have pas sed through them . North Afr ica can be, as it has been, a 
bridge to link three continents in peace, cooperation and progress. It can also 
be, as it has been, an avenue o! conquest which, if history is any indicator, 
leads only to the ruin of both conqueror and conquered. 
In recent times, Europeans, and particularly the French, have gone to 
North Africa in great numbers. They brought many of the benefits of material 
progress as welt as political stabllity to the area and they took much from it. 
The colons, as those who arc settled in the region ar~..: called, have a great 
stake in all three regions and especially in Algeria whc;rc they number a million. 
Their slake, however, is in many ways a privileged one, supported by the power 
and sacrifict.;• of Metropolitan France . The colons seuk to maintain that stake. 
Many arc d\!tcrmined to maintain it by any means, including the ter r orization 
of the Moslem populations and even the intimidation of the Frt.:nch Government 
itself. 
The great preponderance of the inhabitants of North Afrtca, however, 
are not French or European. They are mostly Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 38, Folder 16, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 9 -
Moslcrns. And th-.! Moslems oi North Africa -- to id··ntify the p ople of the 
three areal'! -- have been caught up in the same wave of militant nationalism 
and pan-Islamism which has swept through most of the countries of the ~1i~i<1t~ 
East tn the decade since Vorld War II. These movement5 among the Mosl.:!rns 
nf North Africa ari!, I bclt...:v-a, for the most part authentic expressions of a 
widespread popular discontent with a status of political inequality and social 
and economic mis~ry . They contain their share of extremists who, like their 
counterparts among the colons, arC; prepared to resort to the terrorizing of 
peaceful Europeans and even other Mcslems in their determination to achieve 
immediate political domination in the North African regions. 
UnLil recently, thl.! situatLOn in Nor1h Africa has be'-n relatively fre~ 
of Communist influence . That docs not mean that it will long remain so . On 
the contrary, it is cl..,ar in Communist bro:1dcasts from Europe, from the 
activities of agents in Not·th Africa, and from th~ diplomacy of tht. Soviet Union 
in the Middle East -- it is clear that lhc Communists arc seeking by any means 
to make inroads into th\.'! Moslem nationalist movements . 
And I believe wo.; may expect them to make those inroads unless the 
causes of North African discontent arc allcviat~d in time, unless progress is 
made in restoring a polttical stability to that area which is acceptable to the 
great majority of the nativ~ p~oplcs. 
I! Communist influ .... nc~ grows, where will the responsibility lie? Vlith 
th~ North Africanc who are st:eking r edress of legitimate political and economic 
grievances? We can hardly blame a drowning man for grasping at the tail of a 
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shark if, in his agony, hl: misLakes it for a log . Can we plac ... the rcsponsibthtv 
on the diabolic genius of th(. Communists? They will be only too glad to tak~ it 
and they will offer North Africa as one mor~ evidence of th~ invincible marcn 
of communism towards world domination. 
H communio m tnk ... s root in North Africa, I think the responsibility 
w1ll not be attributable to the invincibility of that ideology or any exceptional 
ability on the part of its adherents. Nor wtll it be attributable to the native 
pcopl~ who s~ck to rectify long - f..:stcring wrongs. It will lie instead with those 
who pret~nd to excrcis.; political r~sponsib"lity in North Africa -- be they French, 
Spauish or Moslem -- but who fail to exercise it with understanding, with com-
passion and with courage . It will lie with thost! European fanatic:~ in North 
Africa, France and cls~wherc ·whose only answer to the restlessness of a whole 
people is a sterile anJ, in the l0ng run, futile rcprcs&ion. It will lie with those 
religious and pclitical extremists m the Moslem camps of North Africa and 
nearby countries whoa-.: personal will to power is so overwhelming lhat in the 
name of freedom they adopt irreconcilable positions which can destroy the m-:an-
ing of freedom for thdr own people and undermine it cls•:!whcrc in the 
Mediterranean regions. 
1 do not undcrest\mate the di!ficulti~s of r econciliation in North Africa. 
The bitterncsses are i.ntt!ns.a. The dilemmas arc many. The stakes in terms 
of power for a few arc so high that th~y are blind to all considerations other 
than what appears to be their imm~.::diate self-interest. 
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13dor~ thu chance to obtain a just and reasonable settlement is lost, 
however, I hope that those who gibe at the tdea will consider the consequences 
which wilt flow from the failure to achieve one. 
SomG of these consequences arc already appar~nt. The)' can be seen 
in tht! ugly face of racial ancl religious terrorism. That face has t~hown itself 
in many parts of North Afr1ca during th{; past few years -- in tl.e massacr~ of 
thu innocunt, native and French alike, in the swift and deadly swt:!ep of the 
knife of the political assassin, in the sabntagl;! of properties repres~nting 
decades of patient creative labor by both Europeans and Moslems. 
Much innoc ... nt blood on both sid<..s has already been shed in North 
Africa. Much wanton d~struction has already been done. But more blood will 
flow and mo rc damage will be done unlcs s a settlement is achieved. What 
spoils will remain to the side which may emerge vic:torious 1f th~ conflict 
continues? They will inherit an accumulation of ruins. 'fhty will gain a 
heritage of smoldering hatred and fear, a sullen acquiesencc on the part of the 
defl.!at~d. 
And if that is the mexorable consuqucncc of an 11 all o r nothing" attitude 
1n North Africa, what of its 1mpact on France? 
Franc~ 1s already bleeding itself white to maintain a force of over 
300, 000 men in North Africa. What have these sacrifices produced other than 
the scorn and derision of thos..: who, forgetting the real greatness of France in 
Europe, still dream Louts Napoleon's nineteenth century dream of grand empire 
in th~ deserts and swamps of the tropics? What have these sacrifices produced 
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but the dtsmay of the d\!c ... nt p'-ople of France and th" vutual immobtliz.ation of 
their government? Now it has even come to mobs and rio ts tn the streets of 
Paris. What wtll follow? The barncades and th .. n, after, th .. iron fist o f 
tyranny? How much longer will the frc ... institut10ns of Franco withstand thes 
prcssur..:s ? How mul:h lonr,cr befor\.: Western European cohesion --deprived 
of the cssuntlal cement of Fr~nch inspirallOn -- how much long~r before it 
b~::gins to crumble? 
And what of the Moslem p~::oplc in Norlh Africa? Will they gain from 
the: agonies of France? Have they forgott\!n the achievements of Fr~nch culture 
and cl\' ilization? Have they forgctten, in truth, th:ll the very demands for 
fr~edom and equality which they now echo throughout the land are themselves 
de rived fro m th\.! traditions of liberty which flow from France? 
1hcsc ar ... ~urnt! of the questions which I hope tho~c "ho call for 11all 
or nothing•• in North Africa -- European and Moslem :\like -- will consider 
carefully before it is too late. 
There can be a peaceful solution to this crisis. But lher~ can be a 
solution, in my opinion , only if th~ r e alities of the situation arc fully and frankly 
r ecogmzcd . Th<::rc can be a solution only i£ the r~sponsiblc polittcal leaders 
-- French and Moslem -- have the courage and dctc rmination to act fi:-mty on 
th~.:se reatiti.:ls and if they have the sympath ... tic suppo rt of other nations whose 
fundamental self-interest lies in the preservation of peace in North Africa and 
the Mediterranean r egion . I mean this country as well as the Wcsterr. European 
nations and th..: n~arby Arab states. If ther~.: is more stirring of tho.: troubled 
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waters, if there i6 a stubborn resistance to necessary change and if there is 
malicious fishing for advantage by outsiders there shall be no solution in North 
Africa and all will stand to lose in the long run regardless of any momentary 
profit that may be gained. 
If there is to be a stable and meaningful peace in North Africa, I 
believe these principles must govern it : 
1. The legitimate gri~vanccs of the Moslem people must be corrected; 
the economic, political and social inequities must be ended as rapidly as possible . 
2. The rights of thv European setlle1·s to a place in thu future of North 
Africa must be protecte d. 
3 . Responsible officials in North Africa must be prepared to deal 
swiftly and impartially with the terrorism of the mob and the assassin, be they 
European or Moslem. 
I realize, Mr. President, that it is easy to state principles involving 
other peoples several thousand miles away . 1 realize, too, that if the crisis 
is met successfully in North Africa, i.t will be met primarily as a result of the 
efforts of the French and the Moslems . My purpose in stating these principles 
is not to prcsume to guide them -- the responsible leaders on both sides have 
long since recognized them. My purpose in emphasizing these principles is to 
make clear what I believe to be the only valid framework in which American 
foreign policy can exercise a constructive influence towards peace in North 
Africa . 
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Our direct int~:rests in North Africa arc r elahvely hmited and there 
is little d\}sirc o r hkelihood cf any increase in the ncar future. Few Americans 
restde in the area. Our coml'l"ercial intcrO?sts arc small. We have rights in 
Tangier and ~.;xtrate:rrilorial privileges in Morocco which we are in the proces s 
o£ snrrl.lndcring. w~ lh.\'C air bases in Morocco, built at creal cost, not !or us 
alone, but as part of the defense structure of the North Atlantic community and 
th..: Mcditen·an~.;an area. 
If our dir<.!Ct int~rcsts are limited, however, our indirect interests --
as I have already tned to point out - - ar~: immense . They add up to the urgent 
n\.!CCSSlty of finding a peaceful solution of the North African cnsis . Our interests 
will be served by a foreign policy which contributes to that end, to the devdop-
mcnt of an accommodation that is acceptable tc thl.! vast majority of Moslems in 
North Afl'ica and to France. We cannot be a party to any plan to rcpr\!ss the 
legitimate as paations of the Moslem peoples in No1·th Africa but at the same 
lime wt! cannot abandon a frt:..; France in its hour of great need. These are not, 
necos sarily, mutually exclusive objt:ctivcs. They m ~.:d not immobilize our 
fo'!'cign policy in that region . 
Th~ way for us, then, is clear. If France and tho.: North Africans 
move towards a reconciliation of their mt<!rests -- if the concept of 11 independencc 
with interdependence" takes root --there may be a constructive role which, 
together with other free nations, we can play; but only in those circumstances. 
In some respects, there is hope for a 8\)ttlcm\!nt along those lines. In 
Tunisia important political agrcemento have atready been achi .. vcd. Something 
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similar is taking place with respecc to Morocco, despite the reticence of Spain 
·which controls a substantial part of the Sultanate . In both these regions, I 
bt.:lievc a sound basis for further progress ha~ been laid. 
Alg\!ria, howcv<:r, which is of the greatest importance to France, 
presents far more difitcult and complex problems. Algeria has long been 
treated as an integral part of Metropolitan France, as "France south of th~ 
Mediterranean." France seeks a solution respl:cting Algeria in the alleviation 
of the political inequities and the crushing burden of poverty under ·.vhich most 
/dgerians liv\!, but without changing the present int~gration of Algeria and 
France. No one can say with any c~rtainty whether this approach will be 
cfiectivc. While it is being attempted, moreover, there is little that thts 
country or any other country can do without complicating the difficulty. 
Mr. Pr~sid~.;nt, we hav"- had expressions of despair in this r.ountry 
over thc North African crisis interspcrs\!d with Lhe smiling assurances that 
condit1ons were improving in the world. What W\! hav~.; not had is a facing up of 
the significanc..: of this situation lo us. What w ... have not had is the kind of 
intelligent initiative in our policies which might contribute to a p~aceful 
solution in North Africa. 
At the outset I made ch;ar to the Senate my personal limitat1ons 
in reviewing this situation. As I pointed out, we may not have all the (acts . 
But o n the basis of what we do know, on the basis of the facts which I have 
attempted to summarize here today, I am not satisfied that we have: done what 
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might be done to increas\! the prospects for p\!aC~ in North Africa. It seems to 
me that th~ logic of tltese facts opens up avenues of explvration in foreign poltcy 
whtch the Executive Branch might weil pursue and yet has not pursued, at least 
to th"" knowledge of the Scnat~. 
As I noted, Ttlnisia and Morocco aru both moving to'-"ards !re.!dom with 
interdependence on the hasis of agrc"'ments acceptable to re~ponsible Ft·ench and 
North African nationalist leaders . The t1m~ may be fast approachtng when con-
sidl:ration should be given lo inviting both Tunisia and Morocco -- and Spam - -
to associate with NATO. Tllc-y ar"' e:3 Fcntial components in ~he maintenanc..: of 
peacl. in the Medilerran~nn and I belicv.:! that NATO has much to offer for their 
security . 
It seems to me too that NATO, or perhaps the Western European Union, 
could play a significant rclc in easing the economic str ... s sc..:s that the present 
transition in North Africa places on both European and Moslem. ls it too much 
to anticipate thnl a joint economic effort by tht. NATO countries could contribute 
imm~asurably to the common progress of both? Is it too much to anticipate that 
such an effort might do much to alleviate the economic causes of discontent and 
f"'ar m North Africa, that it might help to develop a mutuality of interest wh1ch 
cculd translate the concept of "independence with interdependence" into a reality .... 
Is it too much to cxpl.!ct the Executive Branch to exercise some initiative m lhis 
direction? 
Mr. Presid~;nL, I do not know whether these thoughts may have applica -
tion . I do know, however, that a critical situation exists in North Africa which 
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contatns dangerous implications for the United States. It seems to me that in 
such circumstancl.!s, th\!re is a responstbilily to do more than alternately exude 
confidcmcc or despair . There lS a responsibility on us to raise the 1ssues that 
are involved and to consider possible ways in which they may be reso l ved . Tha t 
is alt, Mr. President, that I have been trying to do today. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * 
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